Quantifying Cyber Resilience: A Systemic Risk Perspective on Critical Infrastructure Protection

Abstract

Abstract:  Modern critical infrastructure systems—energy grids, water utilities, transport corridors—function as tightly coupled cyber physical webs where localized disruptions cascade into national crises. This paper adapts systemic risk metrics from financial contagion theory to measure cyber induced fragility across interdependent sectors. We construct a multilayer network model linking 412?operational nodes in a G 20 nation, assign vulnerability weights from recent CVE disclosures, and simulate adversarial attacks of varying sophistication. Our stress testing engine reveals nonlinear tipping points: once 18?% of key automation controllers are compromised, outage probability triples within two hours. We validate findings against historical blackout data and discuss policy levers—micro segmentation, coordinated incident response drills, and cyber insurance incentives—that can flatten contagion curves.

Keywords: Cyber?Resilience; Systemic?Risk; Critical?Infrastructure; Network?Science; Attack?Simulation