Reputation-Based Decentralized Governance Using Smart Contracts for Transparent and Manipulation-Resistant DAO Voting

Shivani Bansal, Rituraj Rawat, Vandana Rajput, Abhishek Sharma

Abstract


Decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) use blockchain
infrastructure and smart contracts to coordinate collective decisions, allocate
treasury resources, and modify protocol rules. Yet token-weighted voting may concentrate decision-making power among large holders, while identity-based voting can be vulnerable to Sybil attacks and reputation systems can be manipulated through contribution farming, collusion, or entrenched social hierarchies. This paper reviews relevant DAO governance research and proposes a layered reputation-based voting framework designed to improve transparency while limiting common manipulation pathways. The framework separates reputation evidence from token ownership, uses contribution categories and time-sensitive reputation, constrains individual voting influence, and combines proposal validation, commitment–reveal voting where appropriate, quorum rules, timelocks, audit events, and bounded challenge procedures. It also identifies trade-offs involving privacy, participation costs, accessibility, governance capture, and smart-contract security. This manuscript is a narrative review and design proposal, not a report of a deployed system or an empirical experiment. Accordingly, it does not claim measured performance gains. The proposed architecture should be evaluated through formal threat modelling, adversarial simulations, smartcontract testing, and controlled pilot deployment before use in high-value governance.

KEYWORDS: Decentralized autonomous organization; DAO; smart
contracts; reputation-based voting; Sybil resistance; governance security;
blockchain; vote manipulation; transparency.


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